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This chapter examines Britain’s “compensation culture.” This is one of the terms most 
frequently used by the media today when discussing claims for damages for personal 
injury.
2
 The expression has a variety of meanings but here we focus upon the 
allegation that society has had to bear an increasing burden as a result of the rising 
number and cost of these claims. Rather than celebrating greater access to the legal 
system whereby the needs of those injured are more likely to be met, the predominant 
view of the culture is a negative one: it is alleged that unwarranted claims have been 
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generated for which ultimately we all must pay.
3
 This chapter examines the key 
factors which have contributed to what has become such a pejorative description of 
personal injury litigation. The analysis is divided into two parts: the total number of 
claims brought each year is discussed first, and this is followed by an assessment of 
the overall cost of disposing of individual actions. The chapter gathers together 
information from a variety of academic and practitioner sources to produce a novel 
and up to date perspective upon the compensation culture debate. 
With regard to the first section the chapter shows that, although it is indeed true that 
claims have increased, they have done so only with regard to specific types of injury. 
What influences our different propensity to claim following one injury as opposed to 
another? Among the key factors highlighted are the working practices of three 
institutions which form the bedrock of our claims system: liability insurance 
companies, claims management organisations and claimant law firms. Criticisms are 
made here of a “dysfunctional” insurance industry; this is followed by a description of 
the rise and fall of an even more criticised claims gathering industry; and finally, 
attention is focused upon the rapidly changing structure of the legal profession 
involved in personal injury. All three of these institutions have had a profound effect 
upon the way that the compensation debate has developed. 
When we turn to consider the rising cost of individual claims we ask to what extent 
are insurers and Health Authorities, among others, justified in their complaints that 
much more money now has to be paid out in damages and costs in order to dispose of 
each claim. The key changes to tort damages awards are summarised. Reforms have 
been made not only of the method by which compensation is calculated, but also of 
the form in which the money is to be paid: periodical payments are now common in 
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cases involving serious injury. Damages for pain and suffering have been raised 
substantially without appreciating the full policy implications, whilst compensation 
for financial loss has had to be revised to match the realities of the wider financial 
world. These reforms are placed in a broader context which sees the increasing cost of 
claims as an inevitable result of closer adherence to the principle of restoring the 
claimant to the financial position that was enjoyed before the injury took place. 
Following proposals to reinforce that principle still further, one of the conclusions 
drawn in the final section is that the structural factors identified here will continue 
generate concern about “compensation culture” for some time to come. 
Compensation Culture Disease: The Dangers of New Diagnosis 
As the medical profession is aware, merely giving a name to an abnormal condition, 
whether physical or mental, can be a very significant event. It can help patients accept 
and come to terms with their illness. However, official recognition may also 
encourage doctors, patients and others to attribute symptoms too readily to the newly 
recognised condition. For example, it may be that children are prematurely labelled as 
suffering from attention deficit hyperactive disorder or dyslexia. The naming process 
makes some individuals too prepared to place the illness or disability into the new 
category. Examples especially relevant to personal injury litigation include whiplash 
injury and various states of mental upset, including post-traumatic stress disorder.
4
 
Claimants may be presumed to be suffering from these conditions as a result of an 
accident without there always being sufficient foundation for this belief. Both the 
condition itself and the risk of developing it may have both been found too easily. 
This constitutes one of many “compensation culture” concerns. 
If we examine the term “compensation culture” itself we can make a similar analysis. 
The phrase has a wide range of meanings. It has come to be used as a broad catch-all 
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term to encompass a variety of concerns including many which are based upon 
misinformation about the litigation system and prejudice about lawyers.
5
 At its heart, 
as we shall see, there is indeed evidence which supports the need for careful 
monitoring of what actually happens in our tort system; there should especially be 
concern about certain features which have developed in recent years. However, the 
identification of potential and actual problems in that system has enabled all sorts of 
accusations to be levelled, many of them without empirical foundation. The ills have 
been too easily laid at the door of exploitative lawyers, fraudulent claimants or 
unscrupulous claims companies. One of those ills is that an increased burden has been 
placed upon society from the rising cost of personal injury litigation and this is the 
meaning associated with compensation culture that will be examined in the two parts 
which comprise this chapter. 
 
A. THE NUMBER OF CLAIMS 
Trends in the Rate of Claiming 
A claim in tort is now made each year by about one person in every 64 in the UK. The 
total number of claims in 2015 is just short of  a million, having exceeded that figure 
in the three years immediately preceding. As revealed in the table below which is 
derived from the official statistics,
6
 road and work accidents predominate. They loom 
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large over the practice of tort even though they constitute, at best, only about a half of 
all accidents.
7
 
 
Whilst historical data are in short supply, those which are available support the view 
that over the long-term there has been a very substantial increase in claims. They 
appear to have risen four-fold since the 1970s. In 1973 the Pearson Commission 
estimated that there were about 250,000 claims.
8
 In 1988 it was thought that claims 
had grown to around 340,000.
9
 This figure then doubled by the new millennium. Now 
claims are a third more than they were at the start of the millennium, the figure of a 
million being exceeded in 2012 and it has continued around  that level since.
10
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This rising trend in claims has not been a consistent one. Indeed the total number of 
claims actually fell slightly between 1998 and 2006 although it has risen in each year 
since. However, overall claims figures disguise major changes which have taken place 
in relation to particular kinds of injuries. These are revealed in the following table.
11
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As can be seen, public liability claims in recent years have remained fairly constant, 
hovering around 100,000 a year. By contrast between 2000 and 2007 the number of 
employers’ liability claims fluctuated considerably, reaching a peak of 291,000 in 
2004. This was largely due to the creation of temporary special schemes of 
compensation for coalmining diseases.
12
 These schemes closed in 2004 and since then 
the annual number of employers’ liability claims has fallen by almost two thirds to 
around 100,000. Although in the last four years claims have increased by a third, there 
are still fewer today than there were in 1973. They have declined in relative 
importance to such an extent that they now account for only 11 per cent of all claims 
whereas in 1973 they represented 45 per cent.
13
 
                                                 
12
 The claims of miners in respect of, firstly, respiratory disease, and secondly, the use of vibrating 
tools led to settlement schemes which were called ‘the biggest personal injury schemes in British legal 
history and possibly the world.’ From 1999–2004 about 760,000 claims were registered. Department of 
Trade and Industry, Coal Health Claims http://www.dti.gov.uk/coalhealth/01.htm  
13
 Only one in seven workers suffering disease or injury make a claim according to the Trades Union 
Council and the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, The Compensation Myth: Seven Myths about 
the “Compensation Culture” (2014). 
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
900,000
MOTOR EMPLOYER PUBLIC
Trends in the number of claims 
2000-2015 (biennial figures) 
2001-02
2003-04
2004-05
2006-07
2008-09
2010-11
2012-13
2014-15
 8 
In stark contrast to the other types of claim, there has been both a long-term and short-
term increase in the number of road traffic accident (RTA) claims involving personal 
injury. Between 2000 and 2004 such claims actually fell but since 2004 there has been 
an increase every year except for the last two with the result that the total over the last 
ten years has doubled to 761,000.  This increase is largely responsible for the long-
term rise in the total of all personal injury claims. In 1973 RTAs constituted 41% of 
all personal injury claims. By 2001 this had increased to 54% and by 2014 RTAs 
constituted 76% of all claims. A notable feature has been the growth of claims 
involving whiplash injuries which now constitute well over half of all claims made.
14
 
Supposedly, by 2004 the UK had substantially more whiplash cases than any other 
European country and since then the number of claims has doubled.
15
 
This rapid expansion in the overall number of claims can be explained by a 
combination of factors that relate, firstly, to the institutions which play a leading part 
in personal injury practice, and secondly, to the individual that makes the claim. The 
following account does not seek to deal with these factors in detail, but does highlight 
some of the more recent developments. 
Institutional and Personal Factors Encouraging Claims  
Our propensity to claim is very much affected by the institutions involved in personal 
injury practice. A major example is the role that trade unions have played in 
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encouraging and facilitating claims for work accidents and diseases.
16
 Following 
injury, members have been able to gain access to union counselling and free legal 
advice. The organised referral of these assisted claims to particular law firms led to 
the first specialised personal injury representation for injured claimants. This made a 
considerable difference to whether a claim was brought and for how much it was 
settled; the reputation of certain trade union lawyers as hard negotiators and 
aggressive litigators continues to this day. However, union membership has declined 
from a peak of about 13 million in 1979 to half of that figure today.
17
 This still means 
that about a quarter of the workforce is covered, although there is a much greater 
concentration in public as opposed to private employment where there is only 14 per 
cent membership. Apart from trade unions, in recent years three other institutions 
have significantly affected our propensity to claim damages: liability insurers, claims 
management companies and claimant law firms. 
1. Liability Insurers 
A fact which has always been well known to practitioners has begun to attract more 
attention from academics recently: it is increasingly appreciated that insurance 
companies are fundamental to tort and the operation of the personal injury system.
18
 
They are its “lifeblood.” What they do very much affects whether a claim is made, 
how it is processed and the amount of damages paid. Liability insurance is not merely 
an ancillary device to protect the insured, but is the “primary medium for the payment 
of compensation, and tort law [is] a subsidiary part of the process.”
19
 
Although the great majority of claims are brought against defendants who are 
individual people, they almost all are insured. In nine out of ten cases the real 
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defendants are insurance companies, with the remainder comprising large self-insured 
organisations or public bodies such as local authorities.
20
 A handful of insurers 
dominate the market so that in motor claims four companies only are responsible for 
over half the premiums collected, these being Direct Line, Admiral, Aviva and 
AXA.
21
 Insurers are the real paymasters for the tort system for they are responsible 
for 94% of the compensation paid out for personal injury.
22
 They fund not only the 
damages award itself but also most of the administrative and legal costs of the system. 
They provide legal representation not only for most defendants but also many 
claimants. The reason for this lies in the rapid expansion in recent years of before-the-
event (BTE) insurance. This form of legal expenses insurance covers almost 3 in 5 
adults.
23
 
The influence of insurers inevitably permeates the system. Intuitively we might expect 
that out of self-interest insurers would act as the system’s gatekeepers and policemen. 
This might involve them discouraging certain claims being made in the first place, 
carefully examining those that are brought and paying up only when evidence of legal 
liability is clear. However, the reality has been far from this. In recent years insurers 
have actually encouraged claims in a number of ways and they have very readily 
made payments, albeit usually of low amounts.  
An insurer’s desire to defend a case has always had to be tempered by cost 
considerations. A heroic defence denying that a driver has been negligent in a 
marginal case may prove not only to be a risky but also a very expensive tactic. This 
is especially the case where the damages claimed are small. Legal costs then can 
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easily exceed the sum being claimed.
24
 This danger is present in the majority of cases 
because the average payment of damages is less than £5,000.
25
 As a result, it is 
unusual for insurers to contest liability: one study of insurers’ files revealed that they 
‘contained remarkably little discussion of liability,’ finding it initially denied in only 
20% of cases.
26
 In fact claimants succeed in more than 9 out of 10 cases.
27
 Because 
insurers make some payment in this great majority of cases, in effect, they encourage 
claims to be made.  
Insurers also encourage claims by giving claimants ready access to a lawyer: they 
provide legal expenses insurance as an extra benefit in the motor and home policies 
they sell.  Not only do insurers profit from this by including an additional cost in the 
premiums charged, but they also used to receive a referral fee from solicitors for each 
personal injury case they forwarded to their associated law firm. Referrals earned 
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insurers about £700 per case
28
 and constituted a substantial income. For example, 
Admiral insurance company received over £18 million in referrals in 2012. This was 
about £6 for each vehicle it insured and constituted 6% of its profit.
29
 A related 
practice of insurers was to collect information about all potential claimants in an 
accident and again sell those details to law firms. The result was the development of 
an ultimately flawed business practice: profit was sought from these individual cases 
but in doing so a more febrile claims atmosphere resulted. Both insurers and premium 
payers at large eventually suffered.
30
 
Gradually insurers became increasingly concerned about the problems which they had 
in part created. These included not only the rising number of claims but also the 
increasing legal costs to which they became subject. Legal aid for personal injury was 
largely abolished in 2000 and this stimulated the widespread use of conditional fee 
agreements.
31
 Under these agreements claimant lawyers could secure an increase in 
their fees in each case that they won. They could recover up to double their costs if 
successful. In seeking to avoid or reduce these costs insurers adopted practices which 
again in the longer term had the opposite effect of that originally intended. For 
example, one tactic still used today is “third party capture.” This is where the insurer 
makes a direct approach to any injured party who is not their own insured. They may 
do so either before or after they have contacted a solicitor. Insurers seek a quick 
settlement of the potential claim before any legal costs can be incurred. This has 
resulted in many people with only very minor injury from the accident in which they 
were involved (or often no injury at all) being offered sums to settle cases which they 
had no previous intention of bringing! Claimants’ solicitors have been especially 
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upset by a small minority of insurers who have approached their clients directly even 
after they have engaged legal help. A test case against one insurer alleging that 
claimants have been induced to break their contracts with their solicitors could mean 
that hundreds of settlements which have been agreed since 2009 will be reopened.
32
  
A similar insurer tactic employed to reduce legal costs which has also had the 
unintended effect of encouraging claims has been for insurers to make “pre-med 
offers.” These are offers made to the claimants’ solicitors very early in the 
proceedings, often immediately on receiving notice of a claim, and before any 
medical report has been obtained. They are pitched at a low level, usually less than 
£1,500, and are aimed at removing the nuisance value of a small claim together with 
its potentially disproportionate legal and disbursement costs. For example, until 
recently a quick offer could save an insurer paying up to £700 (now reduced to a 
maximum of £180) for the cost of a medical report even though these are often 
standard form and can be produced by a mere GP.
33
 Commonly made in whiplash 
cases, these pre-med offers have been heavily criticised on the one hand as attempts to 
buy off claims for derisory amounts
34
 and, on the other hand, as encouraging claims 
where injury is non-existent and thus feeding the compensation culture.
35
 There have 
been proposals that a medical examination and report should be made compulsory 
before settlement.
36
 Although the Ministry of Justice wants to discourage pre-med 
offers it has opted against making such a ban.
37
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Criticism of insurers making very ready offers was voiced by a solicitor interviewed 
as part of the author’s forthcoming contribution to an empirical project investigating 
personal injury practice in several European countries and funded by the European 
Centre of Tort and Insurance Law. He said: 
“… if it becomes known, as I think it did with whiplash, that all you have 
to do is say: ‘I was in a car accident’ and really the insurers just pay you 
some money, I’m not sure that’s necessarily a good message to be sending 
out to the public. I think that insurers have got caught ….If they’re going 
to make those sort of offers, they can expect people just to have a go all 
the time.”   
The conclusion of a Parliamentary committee was that “a highly dysfunctional 
market” has been created “in which the pursuit of profit by the different firms 
involved has led to higher prices for consumers and, in some cases, business practices 
which are not in the consumer interest.”
38
 Overall it is clear that certain routine 
institutional practices of insurers in processing claims have significantly contributed 
to some of the problems now identified as part of compensation culture. 
2. Claims Management Companies 
Claims management companies (CMCs) first emerged about twenty years ago. They 
made money by trawling for accident victims and seeking quick settlements from 
which they extracted high fees from claimants. Alternatively, they passed on their 
clients to solicitors and received a referral fee in return. Today they also offer services 
such as vehicle repair and credit hire, and some can arrange accident reports and 
evidence from medical experts. To recruit clients, CMCs have used a variety of tactics 
from mass media advertising to direct approaches to individuals in the street.
39
 Over 
three-quarters of the population have reported being contacted about making a 
claim.
40
 
The growth of CMCs was fuelled especially by the removal of legal aid in 2000 
which led to the more extensive use of conditional fee agreements. Under these 
agreements claimant lawyers could secure an increase in their fees in each case that 
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they won. They could recover up to double their costs if successful but nothing at all 
if they lost. This potential for increased profit added to the incentives to obtain 
referrals. One problem solicitors faced was that conduct rules prevented them from 
paying CMCs for these claims. However, these rules were flouted on such a regular 
basis that the ban on referral payments was eventually lifted in 2004.
41
 The 
development of an efficient, high volume claims department founded upon referrals 
and advertising proved to be a successful business strategy for a number of law firms. 
However, there was growing concern about the abuses that resulted from CMCs being 
given such a free rein. The press, in particular, used CMC “to describe anything and 
anyone who is perceived as promoting ‘compensation culture,’ ripping off consumers, 
stealing from them and ultimately ‘mugging’ the most vulnerable in our society.”
42
 
There continues to be foundation for such stories: only recently CMCs have been 
found guilty of a range of misdemeanours from helping to arrange ‘crash-for-cash’ 
scams to bribing policemen to steal details of accident victims from a police 
computer.
43
 To combat some of the more extreme practices, the Government began to 
regulate the operation of CMCs in 2007.
44
 In response to attempts to prevent them 
making approaches in person, the companies adapted by sending unsolicited text 
messages and making unsolicited phone calls.
45
 Although these practices were later 
banned, other tactics continued to prove successful as evidenced by the fact that the 
largest increases in claims are found in areas where CMCs are concentrated.
46
 By 
2010 the turnover of CMCs from personal injury work was almost a fifth of that of 
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solicitors’ firms.
47
 The number of CMCs continued to grow, reaching a peak in late 
2011 when there were 2,553 companies operating in the personal injury claims sector. 
However, following increased regulation and, in particular, the banning of referral 
fees in 2013
48
 they have been halved in number to around 1,125. This resulted in a 
similar reduction in their turnover which fell from £455m to £238m.
49
 
As discussed under the next heading, this decline in CMCs does not necessarily 
indicate a commensurate reduction in marketing and the aggressive pursuit of 
potential claimants. At the same time that referral fees were banned, claimant law 
firms also found that they were no longer able to recover their success fee from 
insurers.
50
 These two changes are having a major effect upon the structure of personal 
injury law firms and the business models they now adopt. It is to these changes that 
we now turn.  
3. Claimant Personal Injury Law Firms 
Initially solicitors’ firms were very reluctant to become involved with what was 
considered the distasteful business of claims gathering.  By the late 1990s, however, 
following the relaxation of the rules on advertising, specialist personal injury firms 
were actively seeking clients.
51
 They still avoided the brash techniques of CMCs but 
many were prepared to pay referral fees to these companies; they were content to 
“turn a blind eye” in order to secure a regular flow of work.
52
 Eventually more law 
firms recognised that the work being done by CMCs could be replicated by them. A 
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few firms even adopted certain tactics which matched some of the excesses of the 
CMCs. For example, some offered inducements to sue including free iPads, shopping 
vouchers or cash promises of up to £2,000.
53
 CMCs were banned from making such 
gifts but solicitors continued to be able to do so until 2015.
54
 Although only a 
minority offered such inducements, the aggressive claims gathering of the profession 
has now resulted in solicitors supplanting many CMCs. According to the policy 
director of the Claims Standards Council: 
“In 2013, over 90 per cent of law firms now practice what they used to 
criticise. They market and advertise very efficiently spending over £60 
million a year, which is double the spend of two years ago. They have 
marginalised the traditional CMC to such an extent that less than 70,000 
claims from a total of 600,000 claims are generated by traditional CMC 
activity. That figure will decline and so will CMCs.”
55
 
 
Further changes have occurred following the relaxation of the rules relating to the 
ability of law firms to form business relationships with other enterprises. Since 2011 
non-lawyers have been able to own and manage legal practices as part of an 
‘alternative business structure’ (ABS) which can involve a multi-disciplinary 
partnership. Over 240 licences for such arrangements have been granted by the 
Solicitors Regulation Authority in the last two years. The ABS is a particularly 
attractive vehicle for conducting personal injury work. The wider organisation can 
include within it, for example, a medical reporting agency that is able to give evidence 
on claims, or a financial department that gives advice on how a damages award 
should be invested. For present purposes, however, the significant advantage of an 
ABS is that it enables personal injury firms to avoid the difficulties caused by the 
prohibition of referral fees by making such payments ‘in house.’ As a result we have 
seen leading personal injury firms merge with CMCs or insurance companies. For 
example, Admiral Insurance has taken over the legal firms of Lyons Davidson and 
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Cordner Lewis whilst Ageas insurance is now in partnership with New Law 
Solicitors. Similarly, trade unions have also entered into associations with law firms.
56
 
The growth of ABS practices has been dramatic. Perhaps the best example involves 
the prominent trade union linked firm of Russell, Jones and Walker which acquired 
the notorious CMC, Claims Direct, only for it then to be merged with the very large 
international ABS firm of Slater & Gordon. This took place in 2012 and was the first 
U.K. acquisition of that ABS firm, which originates from and has its shares listed in 
Australia. Attracting some controversy, the firm is the only one in the world to be 
publicly listed on the stock exchange and to derive its capital base from shareholders 
in this way. Slater & Gordon has aggressively expanded in this country since making 
its first acquisition here two years ago. Its share price and profits have risen sharply 
following its take-over of other key claimant firms such as Fentons and Pannone. It 
now has almost two thousand U.K. employees spread around eighteen locations. ABS 
firms accounted for a fifth of the turnover of personal injury solicitors’ firms in 2012 - 
13. That figure will rise sharply as more alternative practices are established. Their 
expansion continues apace, especially that of the Slater & Gordon whose turnover 
doubled in the last financial year to over £100 million, with over 80 per cent of its 
total revenue being derived from personal injury work
57
 
To secure economies of scale there have also been a series of mergers of traditional 
personal injury firms outside of the ABS umbrella. Mergers of whatever kind have 
been accompanied by a drive for efficiency in order to deal with the mass of small 
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claims which dominate the system. Largely because of funding constraints, much of 
the work involving smaller run-of-the-mill claims in these firms is now being carried 
out by unqualified or paralegal personnel.
58
 They are working in what has been 
identified in the USA as “settlement mills” where the assembly line resolution of 
claims “represents quite a departure from the intimate, individualized, and fact-
intensive process thought to underlie the traditional process of tort.”
59
 The legal 
process has been de-skilled and de-personalised in these factories which have direct 
comparators in the U.K. 
The funding reforms and new business opportunities have convinced a former 
President of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers that firms must now “get big, 
get niche or get out.”
60
 In other words, they need to either become larger and more 
efficient or develop specialist skills in order to deal with the minority of claims where 
more serious injury is suffered. Otherwise they will fail. These views are echoed by 
the head of Slater & Gordon who predicts that in the near future just three firms will 
control up to 40% of personal injury claims.
61
 Some may think this a dramatic claim, 
but there have been more firms closing their doors than ever before and ‘run off’ 
insurance is now a favoured topic for professional development seminars. In 2013 a 
book was published giving advice on developing a personal injury practice for the 
future under the more limited costs regime. A year later the author’s law firm went 
into administration.
62
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All this cost-cutting and consolidation in the market is matched by the continued 
aggressive searching for potential clients and the further encouragement of claims in 
tort, albeit in a regime which now has reduced funding because of the loss of the 
ability to reclaim success fees and insurance premiums. It is a time of very rapid 
change. The focus of attention has been upon how claims are funded and what rules of 
civil procedure should apply. However, it is perhaps even more important to 
appreciate the changes that are taking place in the structure of the legal profession and 
the personnel now involved in personal injury litigation. The reforms are thus having 
a considerable effect upon how tort actually operates in practice; they will help 
determine how compensation culture is perceived in the future. 
4. Personal Factors Encouraging Claims 
Apart from these institutional influences, there are factors which are personal to the 
individual claimant which can account for the increase in claims. These are not 
discussed in detail here partly because the analysis of “naming, blaming and 
claiming” is well known.
63
 That is, the individual first has to recognise that he has 
suffered an injury; then he needs to attribute responsibility; and only finally does he 
seek formal recompense for his loss.
64
 The increase in claims is the result of a 
complex mix of changing personal factors which affect all three parts of this analysis. 
It is certainly the case that we are less prepared to put up with misfortune than in the 
past. Today we are more likely to recognise that we have suffered from wrongdoing. 
We are better able to identify, for example, the work-related factors that are the cause 
of our injury or disease, and we are also are more willing to sue our employer. To an 
extent this may be because we have less fear of recrimination although many workers 
are still concerned about discrimination after being labelled an “awkward” employee. 
The seriousness of the injury is also a major factor in determining whether a claim is 
made for it is clear that it is much more likely that recompense will be sought if 
substantial financial loss is suffered.  
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This last fact may make it appear that tort compensation follows where the need is 
greatest. However, in fact the reverse is true. This is because the vast majority of 
claims brought today are for relatively minor road traffic injuries which have little 
effect on the pocket and no long-lasting consequences. The increase in these types of 
claims reflects a significant change in social mores. Even though the injury is minor, 
we have been encouraged to seek compensation as if it were a consumer right. Artful 
advertising can make lawyers appear not just accessible but even friendly and their 
hourly charges do not hold the fears they once did. The claim appears risk-free, stress-
free and involving merely an administrative process. It is legitimised by the routine, 
de-personalised and non-adversarial nature of the mass of litigation for minor injury. 
The message is that you hardly need to get directly involved and that you will 
certainly not end up in court; your claim will be dealt with as merely a private 
transactional exercise arranged between anonymous bureaucratic organisations. 
When the individual weighs up the pros and cons of claiming a major element will be 
the risk of incurring legal costs against the level of potential reward. The fear of being 
out of pocket should the claim fail has been largely removed by the “no-win, no fee” 
mantra supplemented by the availability of insurance against potential liability to pay 
the defendant’s costs. The possibility of getting nothing from the process seems 
remote. The utility of claiming therefore seems high. This is accentuated by the 
increasing levels of damages on offer. This brings us to consider the second part of 
this chapter which focuses upon the rising cost of individual claims. 
 
B. THE RISING COST OF CLAIMS 
1. The Changing Form of Payment: Periodical Payment Orders 
A significant cause of the increased cost of claims has been the change made in the 
way in which damages may now be paid: periodical payments have replaced lump 
sums in many cases where serious injury is involved. The lump sum system survived 
almost intact until about twenty five years ago. Damages almost always took the form 
of one large payment made on a once and for all basis. However, that system imposed 
upon claimants an enormous responsibility for their future: they had to manage the 
lump sum in order to ensure that it would continue to meet their needs for the rest of 
their life. Unfortunately, inflation and the vagaries of the returns upon investment 
 22 
often resulted in the rapid erosion of the compensation. In addition, the damages were 
bound to be insufficient where losses continued for a longer period of time than that 
forecast in the settlement or in the court judgement. This frequently happened where 
the compensation depended upon an assessment of life expectancy for then the money 
was bound to run out if the claimant lived longer than forecast. Recipients of damages 
awards thus not only had the risk of investment thrust upon them but also the risk 
presented by their own mortality. Accident victims who did not die prematurely 
inevitably found that their compensation eventually would prove too little. 
To counter these criticisms the concept of a structured settlement was developed.
65
 It 
enabled seriously injured claimants to receive regular annuity-based payments which 
could be guaranteed to last for their lifetime. In addition, the payments were free of 
tax and could be protected against inflation in prices. Claimants receiving structured 
payments were relieved from the stress of having to invest and be responsible for a 
lump sum far greater than most people encounter in their lifetime. In spite of these 
benefits, expansion of structured settlements was hindered by a variety of factors, 
including the refusal of many professionals to give proper consideration to the merits 
of the alternative form of payment. This was aided by the fact that either of the parties 
unilaterally could veto any proposed settlement based on periodical payments. The 
result was that, largely through inertia, the lump sum retained its dominance.  
However, this was changed by legislation which came into force in 2005. The Courts 
Act removed the parties’ veto and gave judges the power to impose a periodical 
payments order (PPO) even if it was against the wishes of either, or both, of the 
parties.
66
 A former President of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers concluded 
that the legislation was “the most important development ever relating to the law of 
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damages.”
67 
Judges are now required to consider making a PPO in any personal injury 
case which comes to court if it involves future pecuniary loss. Although only a small 
percentage of cases involve such future loss, these claims are responsible for a 
substantial amount of the overall damages bill: insurers have estimated that the top 
one per cent of cases account for 32 per cent of total monies paid to claimants.
68
 
Defendants and their insurers are now faced with a much higher bill in these 
periodical payment cases. There are two reasons for this. The first relates to the way 
in which most of these arrangements are funded. To safely guarantee the lifetime 
payments liability insurers usually purchase annuities from life offices. This can prove 
much more expensive than paying lump sum damages partly because of lack of 
competition in supplying the annuities required. Arranging for PPOs could be costing 
liability insurers up to a third more than under the lump sum regime. 
The second reason for the increased bill relates to the radical changes made to the way 
in which periodical payment damages are now assessed. Claimants have been given 
considerable incentives to choose PPOs over lump sums. The advantages derive from 
the fact that there is now no need to calculate what lump sum would be required in 
order to work out the value of the periodical payments to be made. Instead, using a 
“bottom-up” approach, the court must assess the claimant’s needs for the future and 
then order that periodical payments matching those needs be paid irrespective of their 
capital cost. These annual payments do not have to be adjusted to take account of 
speculative estimates of the claimant’s life expectancy. Nor do returns have to be 
forecast of the income that arises upon investment of the damages because the lump 
sum is simply not there to invest. Instead, the defendant must comply with the order 
to make the specified regular payments no matter how the market performs and even 
if the claimant lives longer than forecast. In contrast to the traditional lump sum 
system, therefore, it is the defendant rather than the claimant who is now exposed to 
an uncertain financial future by being burdened with the twin risks of investment 
return and mortality. 
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This can be explained further by noting that in the calculations needed for a PPO there 
is no place for the ‘Ogden Tables.’
69
 That is, multipliers and discount rates are not 
used: no multiplier is required to reflect the period of years of the loss in order to 
convert it into an immediate capital amount; and no discount rate is needed to convert 
the future stream of financial losses into a capital sum representing present day 
values. As considered under a later heading, the discount rate continues to operate 
very harshly against claimants if they seek a lump sum. The rate has been set far too 
high and expects claimants to obtain an unrealistic return on their damages. By 
contrast, for PPOs defendants cannot take advantage of the artificially high estimate 
of investment return embedded in the discount rate for lump sums. Instead they can be 
ordered to provide annual payments irrespective of what this might cost as an 
equivalent capital sum. Furthermore, the order extends for an uncertain period – the 
rest of the claimant’s life. The risks that arise which relate to both the investment 
return and the longevity of the claimant are thus entirely transferred to the defendant 
and this carries with it a substantial additional cost. 
The final advantage of a PPO over a lump sum is that, following a key appellate 
decision, periodical payments can now be inflation proofed by being tied not just to 
the future rise in prices but to the rise in earnings.
70
 This is of considerable importance 
in ensuring that a claimant’s care costs will continue to be met. This is because, in 
general, the wages of carers over time will significantly exceed price inflation and 
will considerably increase the bill for future care. As a result of the case which 
allowed for this wage inflation the number of cases involving PPOs has increased 
substantially. The additional care costs which defendants must now bear, together 
with those costs arising from the new investment and mortality risks described above, 
account for the considerable rise in the true value of damages in these serious injury 
cases. 
2. Recovery of State Benefits from Damages 
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Since 1990 defendants and their insurers have had to pay more for claims because 
they have had to reimburse the state for certain benefits received by the claimant as a 
result of the injury suffered.
71
 The state has been able to recover some of the cost of 
its social security expenditure and health care costs: public finances have thus been 
replenished. There are limits on the amounts that can be recovered. For example, 
money can only be sought for benefits received up to the date that a case settles; 
social security and NHS treatment provided later are at public expense. Another limit 
is that there is a maximum sum payable for health treatment. However, over the years 
the recovery scheme has proven effective in clawing back increasing amounts of 
money, especially following the inclusion of health service charges in 1999. By the 
new millennium the amount of social security recovered had risen steadily and had 
reached £201 million a year. Since then, caused partly by a marked decline in work 
accidents, the amounts recovered have fallen by a third so that in 2013–14 only £134 
million was recouped.
72
 However, to this must also be added the health service 
charges recovered for that year of £223 million so that in total £357 million was 
repaid to the public purse. Unlike social security, these health service costs have 
increased year on year and now constitute the more important source of revenue. Even 
so, they represent but a tiny fraction of the actual expenditure on the NHS.  
The recovery scheme has clearly increased the cost of claims, added to the premiums 
charged by insurers and thus contributed to one of the concerns about compensation 
culture. However, its effect upon the number of claims brought varies. Because the 
NHS is freely available, claimants are not directly affected by charges made to 
compensators for health costs. By contrast, the recovery of social security benefit has 
affected them. This is because the scheme enables compensators to reduce the 
damages that claimants can obtain from them by the amount of social security benefit 
that has to be repaid to the state. Damages have thus been reduced and, as a 
consequence, the incentive to claim.  
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However, the incentive was restored somewhat when the scheme was changed to 
exempt the claimant from any reduction in that part of the damages award which is 
paid for non-pecuniary loss. This means that no reduction in damages is to be made, 
even if a claimant receives benefits, provided that no financial loss has been suffered 
because, for example, earnings have been unaffected and there has been no need to 
pay for treatment or care. The compensation then is for pain and suffering alone and 
there can be no reduction. This is so even though the compensator remains liable to 
repay the social security benefits the claimant has received. In effect, such claimants 
have the whip hand in negotiations and can force advantageous settlements. They can 
emphasise that the longer the claim remains unpaid the larger will be the bill for 
benefits even though this will not reduce the amount of damages to be paid. The result 
is that insurers are encouraged settle certain claims promptly and at the higher end of 
the potential scale of payment. Predominantly these claims involve minor injury such 
as whiplash where it is often the case that the only compensation to be awarded is for 
pain and suffering. The recovery of benefits scheme can thus affect aspects of 
compensation culture. 
3. Non-Pecuniary Loss and Increasing the Price of Pain 
In practice, it is the compensation paid for pain and suffering that often provides the 
financial incentive to claim. In many cases it is the only head of personal injury 
damage that is sought. In recent years this compensation has increased significantly. 
There are a number of reasons for this, the most important being the changes made as 
a result of the test case of Heil v Rankin.
73
 The judges in that case took the 
opportunity to raise awards for pain, suffering and loss of amenity in two ways: 
firstly, they increased payments for more serious injuries by up to a third; and 
secondly, they tied all awards in future to the rise in the Retail Prices Index. This 
second measure has accounted for a further rise in damages of about quarter since the 
test case was decided. Irrespective of whether the policy reasons given in the case 
justified these increases,
74
 it is clear that damages for non-pecuniary loss have risen 
substantially as a result. For example, at the top end of the scale, damages for severe 
                                                 
73
 [2000] EWCA Civ 84, [2001] QB 272. 
74
 R. Lewis, ‘Increasing the Price of Pain:  Damages, the Law Commission and Heil v Rankin’ (2001) 
64 Modern Law Rev 100.   
 27 
brain damage or tetraplegia have increased from £150,000 at the turn of the century to 
about £330,000 today. 
Damages have also risen as a result of the introduction and extensive use of the 
Judicial College’s Guidelines for the Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury 
Cases.
75
 This is a book to be “packed in every judge’s lunch bag”
76
 for it provides the 
parameters within which awards for pain and suffering are to be assessed. It is a two 
way process in as much as it informally guides courts but also tries to reflect their 
most recent decisions on quantum. First issued in 1991, it has been revised almost 
every two years and is now in its twelfth edition. It has become increasingly detailed. 
The booklet has been very helpful to practitioners and has removed some of the 
uncertainty that traditionally clouds the negotiation process. However, there can still 
be major disputes on the facts of cases, for example, in deciding which of the nine 
specified levels of neck injury the claimant has actually suffered. Subject to notable 
exceptions the regular revision of the booklet has generally resulted in a real increase 
in the scale of awards for particular injuries. In addition, the inflation update has 
ensured that practitioners have recent figures ready to hand which was not always the 
case in the past. On the whole, claimants have benefitted. To counteract this, insurers 
now want practitioners to be forced to assess pain and suffering by using computer 
software which values claims by incorporating information about the mass of settled 
claims instead of only the few that are adjudicated in court.
77
 Despite the successful 
political lobbying by insurers in recent years, the prospect of displacing the Judicial 
Guidelines with a calibration tool that insurers have devised seems very remote. 
A final cause of increasing damages in this area relates to the changes in funding 
introduced as a result of Jackson reforms.
78
 Claimants have been compensated for no 
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longer being able to recover from defendants two items of expenditure: first, the 
success fee charged by their solicitor; and second, the premium that was paid for after 
the event insurance which was bought to protect against the risk of costs should the 
case be lost. In return for claimants bearing these extra pecuniary costs themselves, 
their damages for non-pecuniary loss have been increased by ten per cent.
79
 On the 
surface this seems an odd method of compensation for it substitutes apples for the loss 
of pears: that is, it increases the pain and suffering award when it is a financial loss 
that has been suffered. Even though the rough justice involved in devising this 
equivalent has some empirical support, it emphasises the peculiar prominence that 
pain and suffering now occupies within the tort system.  
Let us take this point further. The overall increase in this head of claim is especially 
significant because the largest component of damages for personal injury is the 
payment made for pain and suffering: two thirds of the total damages awarded by the 
system are for non-pecuniary loss.
80
 The reason for this dominance lies in the fact that 
the tort system overwhelmingly deals with small claims, the great majority leading to 
damages of less than £5,000.
81
 In these cases claimants suffer very little, if any, 
financial loss from their bodily injury. They make a full recovery and have no 
continuing ill effects. The typical injury involves a whiplash, neck injuries of some 
sort accounting for four out of five claims in the system.
82
 Apart from recovering the 
cost of damage to the vehicle, the claim is usually only brought to recover the 
compensation for pain and suffering. In many cases, therefore, non-pecuniary loss 
                                                 
79
 Confirmed by Simmons v Castle [2012] EWCA Civ 1039. 
80 Pearson Commission above  n 6, vol 2 table 107.  The Health and Safety Executive similarly 
estimated that the cost of including pain and suffering would increase payroll costs from 1% to 2.5% in 
an integrated compensation scheme for work injury. Greenstreet Berman, Changing Business 
Behaviour - Would Bearing the True Cost of Poor Health and Safety Performance Make a Difference? 
(2002). 
81
 In a survey of conditional fee claimants in 2011 half of them received less than £5,000. Insight 
Delivery Consultancy, No Win No Fee Usage in the UK  appendix 5 of the Access to Justice Action 
Group, Comments on Reforming Civil Litigation Funding 
http://www.accesstojusticeactiongroup.co.uk/home/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/NWNF-research.pdf  
The average payment for non-pecuniary loss for cases settled within the claims portal was reported as 
£2,300 in January 2014. 
82
 Above n 14. 
 29 
provides the only incentive to sue for personal injury. It is the engine that drives the 
tort system. By contrast, it also accounts for much of the disproportionate cost of the 
litigation system and it provides opportunities for exaggeration of losses and 
fraudulent claims. As such, it is the root cause of many of the concerns about 
compensation culture. 
 
4. Pecuniary Loss, Discount Rates and the Real Financial World 
The final reason accounting for a rise in the level of damages is that the tort award is 
wedded to the principle of returning the claimant to the position enjoyed before the 
injury took place insofar as it is possible to do so.
83
 In trying to give practical effect to 
this often merely rhetorical aim, judges have been forced in recent years to confront 
the realities of the financial world. This has led to a substantial increase in damages 
especially in cases of serious injury. Various examples of this are given below. 
One of the most notable ways in which the practice of personal injury litigation differs 
from that of a generation ago is in the extensive use of expert evidence. In serious 
injury cases experts have been employed in areas which extend far beyond the 
traditional medical fields. They now consider all aspects of the injured person’s life 
and future needs. This relates to a second change in litigation practice: claim 
schedules are now much more comprehensive than they once were, partly because of 
the involvement of these experts. Lawyers have been able to specify in considerable 
detail what the claimant will require in the future. With expert help, they have been 
able to place more precise monetary figures on what it costs to meet these needs. This 
level of detail and accounting, prompted by the avowed aim of making full reparation, 
has inevitable led to an increase in the value of claims.
84
 
One group of experts who have been crucial in the construction of these detailed 
schedules are the financial analysts. Actuarial evidence is now accepted in courts in 
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ways not thought possible years ago.
85
 It was not by accident that forensic accountants 
proved more important in establishing and developing structured settlements than 
lawyers or judges.
86
 Very recently labour market economists have been added to the 
personal injury financial team. Their role has been pivotal, for example, in 
establishing that periodical payments can be tied not merely to the rise in prices but to 
wages, thus adding considerably to the value of such an award.
87
  
A major contribution of these financial experts has been to refine the ‘Ogden 
Tables,’
88
 the actuarial tables devised especially for personal injury cases in order to 
compute pecuniary losses. Two recent examples will suffice to illustrate how changes 
to these tables have led to further increases in damages. Firstly, successive reforms 
have been made to allow for projected increases in mortality. We now live 
significantly longer than our forebears and this improvement is expected to continue 
into the future. Future mortality figures rather than those based on historic mortality 
are now used and these substantially increase damages, for example, for loss of 
pension rights especially where the claimant is young. These life expectancy gains 
can have a considerable effect in certain serious injury cases. Advances in medicine 
and support services have been such that paraplegics, for example, can today 
generally expect only a small reduction in their life expectancy. As a result, lifetime 
awards of damages have had to be increased to continue to allow for such matters as 
the length of time that future care will be needed.  
A second change made to the tables relates to the allowance made for the prospective 
potential earning capacity of a disabled claimant. Research has demonstrated that 
people with disabilities spend more time out of employment than previously 
thought.
89
 As a result a higher discount is now applied to increase their damages so as 
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to account for their particular difficulties in the labour market. Acceptance of the 
value of such economic and social science data has been an important factor in raising 
damages awards. 
In spite of the increase in damages which has taken place this century, it remains the 
case that claimants are very unlikely to receive ‘full’ compensation; they are not 
returned to the position they were in before the accident. The experience of past 
decades has proven that, for those who need long term care and support, the lump sum 
will prove insufficient. Few claimants injured in their youth have any compensation 
left when they enter old age today. There are several reasons for this but perhaps the 
most important is that too much allowance has been made for the potential return 
which can be obtained by a claimant by investing the damages. A discount rate is used 
to allow for the fact that the claimant receives compensation earlier than he would 
have had done so, for example, if he had been required to work for the wages now 
lost. The discount recognises that investment income can be obtained from this 
accelerated receipt of money. However, the rate used to calculate the damages has 
consistently been wrongly set; the figure has never reflected the true investment return 
that the claimant can actually achieve.
90
 
For thirty years, until 1998, the discount rate was fixed at 4.5% in spite of a myriad of 
changes which took place in the financial world during that time. No matter when 
claimants invested, it was nearly always impossible to obtain the set return. Net 
interest and capital gain fell well short of what was required and this led to rapid 
depletion of the long-term value of the compensation. Today the legal system expects 
a claimant to achieve a real rate of return above inflation and after taxation of 2.5%. 
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With inflation at 2% and taxation costs at a further 1%, in effect the claimant must 
obtain a return of 5.5% at a time when the best secure savings rate is far below that 
figure. It is inevitable that any lump sum awarded will be eroded much more quickly 
than the court presumes. 
The present discount rate was set by the Lord Chancellor in 2001 and was based on 
the return on index linked government stocks (ILGS). Since then there has been a 
severe decline in the return from these gilt investments. Despite this, the 2.5% 
discount rate has remained unchanged and has become increasingly anachronistic. 
The real rate of return after inflation is traced in the below table. Even making no 
allowance for liability to tax, the returns have been far below 2.5%. 
Year ILGS % Yield 
after inflation 
Real Yield 
after tax & inflation 
2001 2.4 2.11 
2003 1.7 1.33 
2007 1.6  
2009 1.4  
2011 0.6  
2013 0.0  
To illustrate the dramatic effect a change in the discount rate can have upon an award 
of damages let us take the case of injury to a young person and an earning loss 
calculated to last for 40 years: 
 Applying the old 4.5% rate the multiplier for the annual loss would be 18.4;  
 for the present 2.5% rate it is 24.85, an increase in damages of 35%;  
 and if the discount rate is reduced to nil so as to reflect the real investment 
return today on ILGS the multiplier is 38.85, an increase in damages of 111% 
since the 4.5% rate was last used in 1998.
91
 
For many years claimant lawyers lobbied for the discount rate to be revised but they 
had little success. However, in 2012 the Ministry of Justice issued a consultation 
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paper asking how the rate should be set.
92
 Insurers were particularly alarmed by the 
prospect of a change in the discount rate and emphasised that in practice claimants did 
not actually invest in ILGS. After effective lobbying, the Ministry were persuaded 
that further investigation was required and a second consultation paper was issued 
dealing with the legal framework.
93
 Although this may have the effect of limiting any 
downward pressure upon the discount rate, it is the change threatened in this area that 
could potentially have the greatest effect on defendants and the overall cost of the tort 
system.
94
 The Ministry at present is sitting on its hands and two years after 
consultation closed it has yet to respond.
95
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing compensation culture this chapter has focused upon the number of 
claims and the cost of claims. Although motor claims have doubled this century, 
largely because of institutional factors and a “dysfunctional insurance market,” other 
claims have remained relatively stable. By contrast the cost of claims has continued to 
increase, albeit for reasons which many supporters of the tort system would support. 
Much of the increase in compensation can be attributed to the overall aim of returning 
the claimant, as far as possible, to the position enjoyed before personal injury was 
suffered. As that principle is developed further, with courts increasingly using 
financial expertise to assist in the calculations, it can be anticipated that levels of 
damages in serious injury cases will continue to rise. As a result, current 
compensation culture issues, together with the reforms in the legal profession which 
much influence them, will continue to be debated for some time to come. 
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